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process would have made it clear that, just as in Horncastle, the two Scottish cases51
were properly distinguishable on the ground that the material facts were different.
On these grounds, including the lack of clarity in Salduz, the Supreme Court
should have refused the appeal.
John McCluskey
EdinLR Vol 15 pp 287-292
DOI: 10.3366/elr.2011.0031
The Supreme Court Strikes Back
On 26 October 2010, the Supreme Court released its judgment in Cadder v HM
Advocate.1 As Lord Hope stated,2 Cadder was, in effect, an appeal against the Full
Bench decision of the High Court of Justiciary in HM Advocate v McLean.3 Both
cases concerned admissions against interest made during police questioning where
the suspect had not been offered access to legal advice. As the law stood, suspects
could have a solicitor informed of their detention, but had no right to legal advice
prior to or during questioning.4 In McLean, the High Court held that the use at trial
of admissions obtained in these circumstances did not violate article 6, despite the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights’ unanimous holding in
Salduz v Turkey5 to the contrary.
A. CADDER v HM ADVOCATE
The appellant had been detained in connection with an alleged assault. As required
by section 15(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, he was told he could inform a solicitor of his
detention, but was not offered (nor did he request) legal advice. He made admissions
which the Crown relied on at trial. He was convicted and appealed on, inter alia, the
ground that relying on these was incompatible with article 6. He was refused leave to
appeal, but applied to the Supreme Court for special leave, which was granted.6 The
case was heard by seven justices, who held unanimously that McLean was no longer
good law in the light of Salduz,7 and remitted the case back to the High Court for
further procedure.8 The leading speeches were delivered by the two Scottish justices,
Lords Hope and Rodger.
51 That is, McLean and Cadder.
1 [2010] UKSC 43, 2010 SLT 1125.
2 Para 1.
3 [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 SLT 73.
4 Criminal Procedure Scotland Act 1995 ss 14(6) and 15(1)(b).
5 (2009) 49 EHRR 19.
6 This note deals only with the substantive issues. See paras 11-12 on the Supreme Court’s reasons for
granting special leave to appeal.
7 Para 63.
8 Para 64.
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B. THE COURT’S REASONING
Lord Hope approached the issue in three stages:
(1) What did the European Court say in Salduz?
The key passage is paragraph 55, where the Grand Chamber explained that article
6(1) requires that:
. . . as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a
suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances
of the case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling
reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction . . . must not
unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will
in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police
interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.
The question was precisely what the European Court meant by “as a rule”. In
McLean, the High Court interpreted it to encompass the possibility that, if sufficient
alternative guarantees were present, access to legal advice was not an absolute
requirement of article 6. Lord Hope described this interpretation as untenable.9
Salduz meant that “every jurisdiction must, to be compliant with the Convention,
have in place a system under which access to a solicitor was ordinary provided as from
the first interrogation”.10 While this did not mean a failure to provide legal advice in
any individual case would automatically violate article 6 – restrictions are possible for
“compelling reasons”11 – “systematic departure”12 from it was not permitted.
(2) Does a Scottish court have to follow it?
In McLean, the High Court argued that, even if even if their interpretation of Salduz
was incorrect, they did not have to follow it.13 The Supreme Court disagreed. Lord
Hope pointed to several cases14 decided by the (then) House of Lords which had held
that a UK court should follow any clear and consistent jurisprudence of the European
Court and should not, without good reason, depart from a carefully considered
judgment of the Grand Chamber. Salduz was a unanimous decision of the Grand
Chamber – a “formidable reason for thinking we should follow it”15 – and had been
“followed repeatedly”16 in subsequent cases. Thus contracting states are under a duty
to give effect to it.17
9 Para 40. Cf J McCluskey, “Supreme error” (2011) 15 EdinLR 276.
10 Para 39.
11 What might constitute “compelling reasons” is dealt with in the legislation passed following Cadder:
see F Stark, “The consequences of Cadder” (2011) 15 EdinLR 293.
12 Para 41.
13 Para 31.
14 Cited at para 45 of Cadder.
15 Para 46.
16 Para 47, where Lord Hope cites numerous examples.
17 Para 48. Cf. Lord McCluskey (n 9).
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(3) Do the other guarantees mean article 6 is not violated?
In McLean, it was suggested by the High Court that Scots law contained sufficient
guarantees to ensure a fair trial, even in the absence of legal advice during
detention.18 These included recording interviews; the inadmissibility of statements
obtained through coercion; the corroboration requirement; the fact that adverse
inferences cannot be drawn from silence; and the limited duration of detention
(a maximum of six hours).19 For Lord Hope, however, these guarantees were
“incapable of removing the disadvantage that a detainee will suffer”.20 Lord Rodger
described such guarantees as “beside the point”.21 The main purpose of legal advice
is to assist the suspect in understanding and enforcing his right not to incriminate
himself.22 The provisions in sections 14 and 15 were deliberately designed to deny
access to a lawyer in the hope that suspects would be more likely to incriminate
themselves23 and thus are “the very converse of what the Grand Chamber holds is
required”.24 For this reason, “there is not the remotest chance that the European
Court would find that, because of the other protections that Scots law provides for
accused persons, it is compatible with [article 6]”.25
C. RELATED ISSUES
A number of supplementary issues arose in Cadder.26 The first was whether Salduz
applies to ‘fruits of the poisoned tree’: “incriminating evidence obtained from
elsewhere as a result of lines of inquiry that the detainee’s answers have given rise
to”.27 Lord Hope answered in the affirmative,28 relying on Gäfgen v Germany.29 But
in Gäfgen the use of real evidence recovered as a result of an unlawful interrogation
(here one which breached article 3) was held not to violate article 6 because it did
not have “a bearing on the outcome of proceedings”.30 The main evidence against
the applicant was a later confession, obtained in a procedurally proper manner, and
the real evidence was used “only to test the veracity of his confession”.31 This seems
18 Para 26.
19 Para 27.
20 Para 50.
21 Para 66.
22 Para 70.
23 See the Thomson Committee’s report: Criminal Procedure in Scotland: Second Report (Cmnd 6218:
1975) para 7.16.
24 Para 93.
25 Para 93.
26 One omitted here is the role of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. On this, see Stark
(n 11) 297.
27 Para 48.
28 Para 48.
29 (2011) 52 EHRR 1.
30 Para 178.
31 Para 179.
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to suggest that fruits of the poisoned tree could be used as corroborating evidence
without necessarily breaching article 6.32
The second was Cadder’s retrospective application. The Supreme Court held that
it applies to “cases that have not yet gone to trial, cases where the trial is still in
progress, and appeals that have been brought timeously but not yet concluded”,33 but
closed cases cannot be re-opened. Closed cases are “convictions that have become
final because they were not appealed timeously, and appeals that have been finally
disposed of”.34 This seems to exclude the possibility that an extension to the two
week period in which an appeal must be lodged35 could be granted on the basis
that Cadder has altered the law. It did, however, leave open the question of ongoing
appeals raised timeously, but without a Cadder ground, given that permission can be
granted for grounds to be added “on cause shown”.36 This has now been addressed
in Birnie v HM Advocate,37 where the appellant was allowed to add such a ground
on the basis that (a) it was “arguable”38 and (b) cause could be shown for doing so.39
In Birnie, the possibility of a Cadder argument was actually identified by the court
at the first calling of the appeal on 16 November 2010. Nonetheless the High Court
permitted its insertion because “[a]lthough a significant period of time had elapsed
since the trial . . . the decision [in Cadder] had only recently been pronounced”.40
This does, however, leave open the possibility of a different outcome where more
time has passed between the judgment and the motion to amend the note of
appeal.
The third was whether admissions made where the suspect has waived his right
to legal advice are admissible under article 6. This was left open by Lord Rodger,41
but it must be the case that the right can be waived. The European Court in Salduz
referred only to “access to a lawyer” not to a requirement that legal advice must be
forced upon a suspect if, in full knowledge of his rights and the consequences of doing
so, he has waived it (and he has the capacity to make that decision).
One further issue remains unresolved. It is unclear whether article 6 supports a
right to legal advice not only prior to but also during police questioning.42 Cadder
seems to suggest only the former.43 Salduz is more equivocal, referring to access
32 The issue is likely to be resolved by the Supreme Court as the Crown has sought to refer this and several
other collateral issues for determination. See “Angiolini to seek further Cadder rulings”, Scottish Legal
News 14 Feb 2011.
33 Cadder at para 60.
34 Para 62.
35 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 109(1) and s 111(2).
36 s 110(4).
37 [2011] HCJAC 4.
38 Para 14.
39 Para 16.
40 Para 16.
41 Cadder at para 96.
42 A point which has been of particular significance in the Netherlands: see C Brants, “The reluctant
Dutch response to Salduz” (2011) 15 EdinLR 298.
43 Para 48.
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“from the first interrogation”.44 Nonetheless, the subsequent legislation confers a
right to legal advice “during . . . questioning”45 as well as prior to it. The equivalent
English provisions allow a solicitor to be present during the interview,46 although
this no longer applies to certain minor offences where advice can be provided
by telephone.47 Both sets of legislative provisions go further than the Canadian
equivalent, where the Supreme Court has declined to interpret the Canadian Charter
as supporting a right to legal advice during interrogation itself.48
Finally, although not explicitly dealt with in Cadder, the general principle
enunciated has relevance beyond detention under sections 14 and 15 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. In HM Advocate v Wilson,49 it was held that the
Crown could not reply on admissions made without access to legal advice by a suspect
questioned during a search of her home under section 23(2)(a) the Misuse of Drugs
Act 1971. The sheriff is surely correct. If the rationale of Cadder/Salduz is protection
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the fact that interrogation took place in the
suspect’s home rather than a police station is irrelevant.50
D. DISCUSSION
The actual decision in Cadder is probably the least interesting aspect of the case
and is certainly less controversial than the emergency legislation that followed. It is
difficult to see how Cadder could have been decided differently, given Salduz and the
obligation for member states to follow unanimous decisions of the Grand Chamber.51
But even setting this aside, the Supreme Court’s reasoning is persuasive. Lord Rodger
derives the right of access to legal advice from the more fundamental privilege against
self-incrimination.52 He argues that legal advice is necessary to assist suspects in
understanding their rights and whether it is in their own best interest to enforce them.
44 Para 55.
45 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 15A(3)(b), as inserted by the Criminal Procedure (Legal
Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s 1(4).
46 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code C (Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers) para 6.8.
47 Code C, Notes for Guidance 6B2.
48 R v Sinclair [2010] 2 SCR 310.
49 Glasgow Sheriff Court, 1 Dec 2010, unreported, available at www.glasgowbarassociation.co.uk/media/
24514/devolution_minute1.pdf.
50 The Supreme Court is likely to rule on this – and several related issues – in due course (see n 32
above).
51 Lord McCluskey attempts to make a case otherwise based, at least in part, on R v Horncastle 2009
UKSC 14, [2010] 2 WLR 47: see n 9 at 285-287. But even if one finds his argument persuasive, the
court inHorncastle was considering Al-Khawaja v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 1, which was only
a decision of the Fourth Section, albeit a unanimous one. Space precludes detailed discussion of Lord
McCluskey’s reasoning here but see n 54 below.
52 Para 70.
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This is not the only rationale for a right to legal advice during detention,53 but if we
accept Lord Rodger’s analysis, it is difficult to see how effective enforcement can
be achieved in any other way. The current practice – of simply reading the caution
at the start of police questioning – does nothing to ensure suspects understand it,
remember it and make decisions about their best interests accordingly. Neither do
any of the other guarantees mentioned in McLean.54 What is more interesting than
the substance of the decision is the fact that it took so long to happen. As Lord
Hope said, “[i]t is remarkable that, until quite recently, nobody thought that there
was anything wrong with this procedure”.55 It is especially remarkable given that
shortly after the Scottish provisions came into force, a Royal Commission was critical
of similar provisions in England and Wales,56 leading to a right to legal advice being
introduced there over 25 years ago.57
While the decision should be applauded, a note of caution might be sounded. In
England and Wales, restrictions have been placed on the right to silence, allowing
adverse inferences to be drawn from silence at police questioning stage in certain
circumstances.58 This was justified, at least in part, by the increased protection given
by legal advisers.59 Lord Carloway’s review, set up by the Scottish Government
in the wake of Cadder, includes in its remit the right to silence, suggesting that
similar changes might be recommended for Scotland.60 Yet research in England
and Wales has found that only 45 per cent of suspects take up the offer of legal
advice.61 If Scotland follows a similar pattern, we may end up with a criminal justice
system in which suspects are less well protected following Cadder than they were
before it.
Fiona Leverick
University of Glasgow
(The author is grateful to Findlay Stark for comments on an earlier draft.)
53 Space precludes discussion here, but it might be justified by reasons such as offering emotional support
(I Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 4th edn (2010) 244).
54 Cf McCluskey (n 9). With respect, none of the other guarantees mentioned in McLean do address the
fundamental issue that, without the benefit of legal advice, suspects may not understand the nature of
their right to silence well enough to make an informed choice about whether or not to assert it. It is
for this reason that many other common law jurisdictions – including those that recognize the right to
silence – have extricably linked it with the right to legal advice. See e.g. R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151
at 176-177; R v Manninen [1987] 1 SCR 1233 at 1242-1243 (Canadian Supreme Court); Miranda v
Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) at 469 (US Supreme Court).
55 Para 4.
56 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, The Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offences in
England and Wales: The Law and Procedure (Cmnd 8092: 1981) paras 4.81-4.93.
57 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 58(1).
58 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ss 34-35.
59 See e.g. Home Office, Report of the Working Group on the Right to Silence (1989) para 57.
60 Scottish Government news release, “Review of law and practice”, available at www.scotland.gov.uk/
News/Releases/2010/11/18123816.
61 P Pleasance, V Kemp and N J Balmer, “The justice lottery? Police station advice 25 years on from
PACE” [2011] Crim LR 3 at 10.
